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Note
Tax, Spend, and Prevent Discrimination: Why Title IX’s
Passage Under the Spending Clause Holds the Answer to
a Quarter-Century Long Circuit Split
Miriam Pysno Solomon*
INTRODUCTION
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 is a well-known,
although somewhat misunderstood, federal statute. A huge number of
educational institutions across the United States receive funding under Title IX.1 In fact, the vast majority of people schooled in this country attend Title IX-funded institutions or programs.2 That trend holds
for both public and private education, from primary school through

* J.D. Candidate 2022, University of Minnesota Law School; Note and Comment
Editor, Minnesota Law Review Volume 106. Many thanks to Professor Mitchell E. Zamoff and Michael A. Pysno, J.D. for their thoughtful guidance on framing and developing this Note. I am grateful to the editors and staff of Minnesota Law Review volumes
105 and 106 for their careful feedback. Lastly, my deepest gratitude to my parents and
husband for their unyielding belief in me. Copyright © 2021 by Miriam Pysno Solomon.
1. See Title IX and Sex Discrimination, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC. (Aug. 2021),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html [https://perma.cc/
8P5T-U6AC] (detailing the scope of Title IX).
2. Id.; see infra note 15 and accompanying text; cf. Richard Vedder, There Are
Really Almost No Truly Private Universities, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2018), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/richardvedder/2018/04/08/there-are-really-almost-no
-truly-private-universities [https://perma.cc/R3J7-SAUM] (explaining that even socalled “private” post-secondary educational institutions receive federal funding); Dean
Clancy, A List of Colleges That Don’t Take Federal Money, DEAN CLANCY (Aug. 10, 2020),
https://deanclancy.com/a-list-of-colleges-that-dont-take-federal-money
[https://
perma.cc/2R52-H73S] (listing only eighteen colleges that do not receive any federal
grant money or participate in any federal financial aid or student loan program); Julia
Donheiser, Chalkbeat Explains: When Can Private Schools Discriminate Against Students?,
CHALKBEAT
(Aug.
10,
2017),
https://www.chalkbeat.org/2017/
8/10/21107283/chalkbeat-explains-when-can-private-schools-discriminateagainst-students [https://perma.cc/X5YX-WZNT] (stating that even most private K–
12 schools may be subject to Title IX because they accept federal funding, “usually
through school breakfast or lunch programs, grants, or funding for low-income students”).
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higher education.3 In 2018, federal funding for higher education institutions amounted to $149 billion, totaling 3.6% of federal spending.4
Annual federal funding for K–12 education totals an estimated $55 billion.5 Title IX is commonly understood as advancing gender equality
in college athletics.6 In recent years, Title IX has been a hot topic as the
Department of Education promulgated new regulations governing the
investigation and adjudication of sexual harassment and assault
claims by colleges and universities.7 Less well-known though, is that
Title IX protects employees as well as students from discrimination on

3. See Donheiser, supra note 2; Clancy, supra note 2.
4. Explore the Federal Investment in Your Alma Mater, DATA LAB https://datalab.usaspending.gov/colleges-and-universities [https://perma.cc/6B8B-SVTF].
5. This does not include funding for early childhood education. David S. Knight,
Federal Spending Covers Only 8% of Public School Budgets, CONVERSATION (July 14,
2020),
https://theconversation.com/federal-spending-covers-only-8-of-public
-school-budgets-142348 [https://perma.cc/WF34-7X3G] (citing 2018 Public Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www
.census.gov/data/tables/2018/econ/school-finances/secondary-education
-finance.html [https://perma.cc/Z4EP-QY42]). In 2011, this figure was closer to $75
billion. Stephen Q. Cornman, Patrick Keaton & Mark Glander, Revenues and Expenditures for Public Elementary and Secondary School Districts: School Year 2010–2011 (Fiscal
Year
2011),
NAT’L
CTR.
FOR
EDUC.
STAT.
(Sept.
2013),
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/2013344.pdf. [https://perma.cc/34QU-CLQ6].
6. Title IX Frequently Asked Questions, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/
resources/inclusion/title-ix-frequently-asked-questions
[https://perma.cc/2UEX
-8RMK] (stating that “the application of Title IX to athletics that has gained the greatest
public visibility”).
7. Valerie Strauss, Betsy DeVos’s Controversial New Rule on Campus Sexual Assault Goes into Effect, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/education/2020/08/14/betsy-devoss-controversial-new-rule-campus-sexualassault-goes-into-effect [https://perma.cc/3T5V-39LB]; Annie Grayer & Veronica
Stracqualursi, DeVos Finalizes Regulations That Give More Rights to Those Accused of
Sexual Assault on College Campuses, CNN (May 6, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/
2020/05/06/politics/education-secretary-betsy-devos-title-ix-regulations [https://
perma.cc/ZD4Y-SBER]; Erica L. Green, DeVos’s Rules Bolster Rights of Students Accused
of Sexual Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/05/06/us/politics/campus-sexual-misconduct-betsy-devos.html
[https://perma.cc/7BED-VWYR].
The Biden administration is now walking back the Trump administration’s
changes. Lauren Camera, Education Department Begins Sweeping Rewrite of Title IX
Sexual Misconduct Rules, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 7, 2021), https://www.usnews
.com/news/education-news/articles/2021-06-07/education-department-begins
-sweeping-rewrite-of-title-ix-sexual-misconduct-rules; see also Tovia Smith, Biden Begins Process to Undo Trump Administration’s Title IX Rules, NPR (Mar. 10, 2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/03/10/975645192/biden-begins-process-to-undo
-trump-administrations-title-ix-rules [https://perma.cc/J6LN-SDES].
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the basis of sex in educational institutions.8 Thus, Title IX demonstrates a clear focus on broadly protecting all people who participate
in federally funded educational programs, not just students.
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to eliminate employment discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, and national origin.9 While its reach is greater than Title IX’s, it too aims to
eliminate sex discrimination from the country’s workplaces, including
schools.10 While both laws strive to accomplish the same end and may
in some cases apply to the same conduct, there are fundamental differences between them. These differences provide strategic opportunities for aggrieved parties seeking redress for alleged sex discrimination. For example, litigants may prefer Title VII if they are seeking
punitive damages or fear they may not be able to prove discriminatory
intent.11 Alternatively, litigants may prefer Title IX, which does not
place a cap on damages and does not require litigants to jump through
administrative hoops prior to filing suit in court.12
The fact that the statutes’ coverages overlap has given rise to conflicts in certain judicial circuits when complainants seeking redress
make the “wrong choice” about which law to invoke. For example, if a
university professor believes her repeated denial of tenure amounts
to sex discrimination, that discrimination would fall under the purview of both Title IX, because she is a university employee, and Title
VII, which governs almost all U.S. employers. If the professor chooses
to bring her claim under Title IX, mainly because its administrative
burden is significantly lower than Title VII’s,13 she risks her claim being thrown out. Despite pleading a prima facie case of discrimination
under Title IX, a court may hold that her only avenue for remediation
is Title VII. To make matters worse, by the time the court hands down
its order, the Title VII statute of limitations may have run, leaving the
professor unable to litigate her claim at all.

8. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 530 (1982) (“[E]mployment discrimination comes within the prohibition of Title IX.”).
9. Infra Part I.A.
10. Title VII makes it unlawful for “an employer . . . to discriminate against any
individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title IX
makes it unlawful for any “person . . . on the basis of sex” to be “excluded . . . under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a).
11. Infra notes 32, 111 and accompanying text.
12. Infra notes 83, 85 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part I.B.1.
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Such was the case in Lakoski v. James, decided by the Fifth Circuit
in 1995.14 There are hundreds of thousands of employees in the
United States situated similarly to Joan Lakoski, protected by both Title VII and Title IX. As of 2021, approximately 17,600 school districts,
and 5,000 postsecondary institutions, charter schools, for-profit
schools, libraries, and museums received funds under Title IX.15 Each
of those institutions employs anywhere from dozens of people to hundreds of thousands of people,16 and each employee is protected by the
provisions contained in Title IX.17 According to the Fifth Circuit, Title
VII’s protections prevent those employees from seeking relief under
Title IX,18 despite ample evidence that Title IX was designed to protect
school employees against exactly the type of sex discrimination that
Lakoski alleged.19 The Seventh Circuit has agreed with the Fifth that
Title VII provides the sole remedy for school employees who allegedly
were discriminated against on the basis of sex.20
The First, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals21
have diverged from the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. In concluding that
14. 66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995).
15. Title IX and Sex Discrimination, supra note 1. There were 13,452 public school
districts in the country during the 2018–2019 school year. Table 214.10. Number of
Public School Districts and Public and Private Elementary and Secondary Schools: Selected Years, 1869–70 through 2018–19, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS.,
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d18/tables/dt18_214.10.asp [https://perma
.cc/B3MF-ETHJ].
16. For example, the University of Minnesota’s faculty and staff totals an estimated 20,000 people. About Us, UNIV. OF MINN., https://twin-cities.umn.edu/
about-us [https://perma.cc/LV3U-YG8R]. The University of Texas system employs
over 100,000 people. About the University of Texas System, UNIV. OF TEX. SYS.,
https://www.utsystem.edu/about [https://perma.cc/Q5CG-6S96]. The University of
California system employs upwards of 227,000 people. The UC System, Overview, UNIV.
OF CAL., https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/uc-system [https://perma.cc/PJ3M
-S8YP].
17. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 531 (1982) (“[E]mployment discrimination comes within the prohibition of Title IX.”).
18. Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 757. There is no test for whether Title VII preempts other
discrimination coverage and, in fact, courts have reached opposite conclusions to that
question in various cases. See Part II for discussion of some such cases, which both
sides of the circuit split have relied on in reaching their holdings.
19. See generally Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, Title IX and Title VII: Parallel Remedies in
Combatting Sex Discrimination in Education, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 701 (2019) (summarizing circuit split and analyzing legislative history to conclude that Congress intended
Title IX to act as a parallel remedy to Title VII, providing additional protection against
sex discrimination).
20. Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 1996), abrogated
on other grounds by Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009).
21. Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988); Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med.
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employees of educational institutions may take their choice of remedial scheme or litigate concurrently under both Title VII and Title IX,
these four circuits have it right. As discussed below, Title VII and Title
IX differ in important respects. They impose different prerequisites to
filing suit, make available different remedies, and were enacted pursuant to different constitutional powers.22 These distinctions reveal
that Title IX claims are fundamentally different in kind from Title VII
claims, and lead to the conclusion that the passage of Title VII should
not deprive private litigants of the opportunity to enforce Title IX. Importantly, none of the circuits involved in this split have fully addressed the different legal duties each Title creates. Moreover, allowing concurrent claims in view of these statutory distinctions also
comports with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)23 and Title
VII jurisprudence.24
Employment discrimination in schools is also hugely harmful not
only to the discriminated-against employees but to the students who
witness the discrimination. When students witness differing treatment on the basis of sex, those experiences inform the students’ understandings of their own abilities, opportunities, and futures.25 If a
society is concerned with gender equality, there is perhaps no more
crucial place to start toward that goal than in schools. Importantly,
Congress has acknowledged the risks associated with sex discrimination in schools numerous times, both while passing Title IX and in the
decades since, citing the harm sex discrimination causes to the employees as well as the students.26
Part I of this Note will provide background on the enactment of
Title VII and Title IX, with a focus on the fact that Title IX was passed
under the Spending Clause, which creates contractual obligations between the government and recipients of federal financial assistance.
Part I will also provide an overview of private rights of action under
other Spending Clause legislation and the treatment of private individuals as third-party beneficiaries of Spending Clause contracts. It
will establish a framework for thinking of Title IX and Title VII as fundamentally different types of claims; Title IX sounding in contract and
Title VII in tort. This Note is the first scholarship to address the circuit
Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2017); Preston v. Virginia. ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31
F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994); Ivan v. Kent State Univ., 92 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1996).
22. Infra notes 53, 86 and accompanying text.
23. Infra Part I.C.
24. Infra Part II.B.
25. Infra Part III.D.
26. Infra Part III.D.
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split through this framework, and courts have largely ignored this distinction as well. Lastly, Part I will describe the legal system’s preference for alternative pleading.
Part II will examine the question at issue in the circuit split: Does
Title VII preempt Title IX sex discrimination claims brought by educational institution employees? It will explain the reasoning of the leading opinions on each side of this circuit split. Moreover, Part II will detail Congress’s repeated acknowledgment of the pervasive problem of
sex discrimination in educational institutions.
Part III will argue that because Title VII and Title IX create distinct
legal duties, the Supreme Court should hold that eligible plaintiffs
should be allowed to bring concurrent claims under each Title or elect
to bring a Title IX claim in lieu of a Title VII claim. This outcome is consistent with the long-standing principle that independent tort and
contract duties can arise from the same conduct. It also comports with
Spending Clause jurisprudence and with the legal system’s preference
for alternative pleading. In addition, allowing the pursuit of concurrent Title IX and Title VII claims acknowledges Congress’s concerns
with sex discrimination in schools while also respecting Congress’s
constitutional grant of authority to tax and spend.
I. TITLE VII AND TITLE IX’S STRUCTURES AND ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS DIFFER IN KEY RESPECTS
This Part will detail the purposes, protections, and remedies of
the two statutory schemes at issue in this circuit split: Title VII and
Title IX. It will detail each Titles’ enforcement mechanisms and explain
that while they may appear similar on their faces, the constitutional
power Congress invoked to pass each Title distinguishes the enforcement mechanisms from each other. This Part also explicates the role
third-party beneficiaries of Spending Clause contracts play in enforcing those statutes. Lastly, this Part explains the FRCP’s preference for
alternative pleading.
A. TITLE VII’S EXPLICIT PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION PROTECTS EMPLOYEES
BY IMPOSING A TORT-LIKE DUTY ON EMPLOYERS
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to advance “equality of . . . opportunities and remove [existing] barriers” for African
Americans.27 Title VII of the Act expanded beyond race discrimination
by “broadly [striving] to eliminate employment discrimination among

27. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971).
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private employers . . . . [and expanding] protection on the basis of national origin, religion, and sex.”28 Discrimination on any of those bases
may manifest in hiring and firing decisions, in compensation and other
terms of employment,29 or through classifying employees in a way
that results in an adverse effect on an employee’s status.30 Under Title
VII, even facially neutral practices or procedures are unlawful “if they
operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices.”31 Thus, “both intentional discrimination and policies . . .
having a discriminatory effect may run afoul” of the Act.32 A complainant may recover for harm under Title VII by proving either disparate
treatment which evinces discriminatory intent,33 or disparate impact.34 Disparate impact cases are adjudicated under a burden-shifting regime wherein the employer may ultimately prevail even if its actions have a disparate impact on a certain protected group so long as
those actions were taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.35
The following Subsections will detail Title VII’s private right of
action and the administrative prerequisites to filing suit under the Title. They will also establish that Title VII imposes a tort-like duty on
employers.
1. Enforcing Title VII Through Its Explicit Private Right of Action
Title VII explicitly created a private right of action and established specific requirements for employees seeking relief.36 It created
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission).37 Subsequent executive orders and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 transferred to the EEOC various enforcement
powers formerly administered by other government agencies.38 Title
28. Zehrt, supra note 19, at 706 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
30. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
31. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
32. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 141 (1977) (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at
431).
33. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
34. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430–31.
35. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (enforcement provisions).
37. Id. § 2000e-4(a).
38. For example, Title VII transferred enforcement and administration of the Fair
Labor Standards Act to the EEOC. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321
(1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 237, and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978), Functions relating
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VII also consolidated enforcement for private and federal employees.39 Generally, in order to have standing to file a lawsuit under Title
VII, aggrieved employees must file discrimination charges with the
Commission within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment
practice.40 The Commission then serves the employer with notice of
the charge41 and works to reach a conciliation agreement with the employer.42 If the parties have not reached a conciliation agreement
within thirty days, the private employee may commence a civil suit
against her employer.43
The framework is more burdensome for government employees.
In those cases, if no conciliation agreement is reached, the EEOC refers
the case to the Attorney General who may commence suit against the
government employer.44 If the Attorney General fails to bring suit
within 180 days, the Attorney General must notify the aggrieved employee who then has ninty days to file suit on her own behalf.45 When
Title VII litigants finally reach court, judges may grant a broad range
of relief, including back pay, injunctive relief, reinstatement after termination, and other equitable remedies.46 Punitive damages may be
available in cases of intentional discrimination.47 Caps on damages under Title VII are determined by the size of the employer and range
from $50,000 to $300,000.48
Title VII claims require proof that the plaintiff:
(i) belongs to a [protected group]; (ii) that [plaintiff] applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite

to age discrimination enforcement functions were similarly transferred from the Secretary of Labor to the Commission. Id. The transfers of authority “reduce[d] . . . the
number of Federal agencies having important equal opportunity responsibilities under Title VII” from fifteen down to three. 5 U.S.C. app. at 239.
39. Id.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
43. Id.
44. Id. The government employee may intervene on this action. Id.
45. Id. Similarly, if the Commission rejects an employee charge, the employee has
the right to file suit on their own behalf for ninety days from notice of the rejection. Id.
46. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(1).
47. Remedies for Employment Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/remedies-employment-discrimination [https://
perma.cc/43PX-592L].
48. Id.
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[plaintiff’s] qualifications, [plaintiff] was rejected; and (iv) that, after [plaintiff’s] rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.49

Implicit in Title VII, and made explicit through caselaw, is that
employees must exhaust the Title’s administrative remedies in order
to bring a suit in federal court.50 The exhaustion of administrative
remedies doctrine is premised on the rule that “no one is entitled to
judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed
administrative remedy has been exhausted.”51 In other words, if a
party wants relief under Title VII, she must engage in each step the
administrative framework provides. If she fails to engage in any of the
steps, a court must dismiss the claim.
Given this exhaustion requirement, Title VII’s administrative
scheme requires a considerable amount of work and waiting on the
part of the aggrieved employee, whether she is a public or private employee. This burden may be too great for some public employees in
particular, especially those seeking reinstatement after termination,
since they may not have the resources to make ends meet while they
wait up to 180 days for the Attorney General to bring suit. These extra
burdens on government employees are particularly important for this
discussion, as state universities are often considered arms of the
state52 and their employees are thus treated as government employees, subject to Title VII’s extra administrative requirements.

49. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1972). These elements
change slightly based on the exact type of Title VII claim implicated, but in general they
follow this same framework. See Peter Gene Baroni, Background Circumstances: An Elevated Standard of Necessity in Reverse Discrimination Claims Under Title VII, 39 HOW.
L.J. 797, 799 (1996).
50. See, e.g., Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 (2019) (“Title VII’s
charge-filing provisions speak to a party’s procedural obligations.” (internal quotations, modifications, and citations omitted)); Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 754 (5th
Cir. 1995) (holding that “[t]he district court erred in submitting [her claim] . . . to the
jury” because “Title VII provides an administrative procedure in which an aggrieved
individual must first pursue administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief”
and “Dr. Lakoski chose to circumvent this procedure.”).
51. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938) (footnote
omitted).
52. See, e.g., EEOC v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisc. Sys., 288 F.3d 296, 299 (7th
Cir. 2002) (noting that the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against Wisconsin, “and
therefore the Board of Regents of the state university system”); Goodisman v. Lytle,
724 F.2d 818, 819–21 (9th Cir. 1984) (acknowledging the University of Washington’s
sovereign immunity); Univ. of Minn. v. Raygor, 620 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Minn. 2001)
(“[T]here is no dispute that the University is an ‘arm’ of the State of Minnesota.”).
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Thus, while Title VII’s coverage may be comprehensive in that it
covers almost all US employers, its enforcement mechanisms may not
always be litigant-friendly.
2. Treating Title VII Violations as Torts
Despite what plaintiffs may view as Title VII’s shortcomings, its
coverage stems from an important social policy in favor of gender
equality. This social policy led Congress to impose a tort-like duty on
employers not to discriminate against any employee on the basis of
sex. Viewing Title VII this way helps distinguish Title VII and Title IX’s
mandates from each other.
Title VII was passed under Congress’s Commerce power.53 Congress has relied on this power to implement a broad range of policies,
from controlling wheat production54 to regulating the sale of intrastate marijuana.55 While the Supreme Court has limited this power in
recent years,56 the Commerce Clause allows for expansive Congressional legislation. Other Commerce Clause statutes include administrative requirements similar to Title VII. For example, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was passed pursuant to the
Commerce Clause57 and similarly requires that aggrieved parties engage with the EEOC and exhaust administrative remedies before filing
suit in court.58
Claims arising under both Title VII and the ADEA have been described as “federal torts” and courts thus “adopt[] the background of
53. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 367 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Title VII was enacted pursuant to Congress’
power under the Commerce Clause.”). The Commerce Clause grants Congress the authority “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
54. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
55. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
56. E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that guns on school
campuses do not have a “substantial relationship” with an economic activity, despite
the sale of firearms across state lines); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(holding that the connection between gender motivated violence and interstate commerce is too attenuated to fall under Congress’s commerce power).
57. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) (citing EEOC v. Wyoming,
460 U.S. 226 (1983) (noting that Congress’s extension of the ADEA to the states was a
valid exercise of its commerce power)). A hallmark of Commerce Clause legislation is
that Congress explicitly invokes the burdens and effects a practice or problem has on
interstate commerce. In the ADEA, Congress noted that “the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary discrimination in employment because of age, burdens
commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(4) (emphasis
added).
58. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d).
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general tort law” in assessing those claims.59 Treating these claims as
torts, an analytical posture that has gained prominence over time,60
comports with the availability of a common law tort claim arising out
of a statutory violation.61 It is also consistent with the common definition of “tort” since it is safe to say that discrimination is a “civil
wrong.”62 Title IX violations do not share Title VII’s similarity to tort.
Instead, as the next Subsection establishes, Title IX claims much more
closely resemble breach of contract actions. This difference is meaningful as it suggests two separate and distinct legal duties and that Title VII’s duty should not preempt Title IX’s.
B. TITLE IX ACTS AS A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND FUNDED
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE BENEFICIARIES OF
THAT CONTRACT MAY ENFORCE ITS TERMS
Similar to Title VII, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
was enacted to combat discrimination. However, Title IX was more
limited than Title VII in that it sought to specifically eliminate only sex
discrimination from the education setting.63 Whereas Title VII extended to almost all public and private employers,64 Title IX applies
only to recipients of federal education funding.65

59. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 416 (2011). While Staub assessed the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), lower
courts have applied the holding to Title VII litigation “because the Supreme Court emphasized the similarities between USERRA and Title VII in [that] decision.” Sandra F.
Sperino, Let’s Pretend Discrimination Is a Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107, 1112 (2014).
60. For a full discussion of the “tortification” of discrimination statutes, see
Sperino, supra note 59, at 1109–15. While there are arguments against treating violations of discrimination statutes as torts, see, for example, Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort
Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2014), the Supreme Court has adopted that framework repeatedly over the past decade. Sperino, supra note 59.
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (AM. L. INST. 1965) (“The court may
adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative
enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively
or in part (a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is
invaded, and (b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and (c) to protect
that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and (d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.”).
62. Tort, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
63. Zehrt, supra note 19, at 710 (citing 118 CONG. REC. 5803).
64. See Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, supra note 38. In order to be bound by
Title VII, employers need employ only fifteen people. Coverage, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/coverage [https://perma.cc/SUF5-C4BE].
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
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Title IX is perhaps best known for its guarantees of equality in
collegiate sports,66 but its reach is much greater. The key language in
Title IX reads: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”67 Causes of action under Title IX
range from sexual harassment to retaliation to deliberate indifference
and more.68
While sex discrimination in employment is not explicitly listed in
the statutory text, courts have consistently held that it falls under Title
IX’s ambit.69 The Supreme Court first acknowledged Title IX’s protection for employees in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell.70 In that
case, the Court analyzed in-depth Title IX’s language, legislative history, and purpose in holding that “Congress[] desire[d] to ban employment discrimination in federally financed education programs.”71 The
North Haven court also highlighted Title IX’s similarities to Title VI of

66. See, e.g., Title IX Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6; see also Murray, Slotkin Lead Colleagues in Honoring Anniversary of Title IX, Landmark Civil Rights Law Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH,
EDUC., LAB. & PENSIONS (June 24, 2019) [hereinafter Murray, Slotkin Lead Colleagues],
https://www.help.senate.gov/ranking/newsroom/press/murray-slotkin-lead-colleagues-in-honoring-anniversary-of-title-ix-landmark-civil-rights-law-prohibiting
-discrimination-on-the-basis-of-sex-in-education
[https://perma.cc/WAE5-S7EE]
(stating that women and girls’ participation in athletics has increased 500% in colleges
and
1000%
in
high
schools
since
1972);
Title
IX: Fast Facts, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/
display.asp?id=93 [https://perma.cc/KJ32-PCY6] (noting that while girls’ participation in sports has never reached the same level as boys’ participation, athletic opportunities for both boys and girls have increased every year since Title IX’s passage).
67. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
68. See infra notes 74–84 and accompanying text. For example, a sexual harassment claim consists of four elements: (1) the educational institution receives federal
funds; (2) plaintiff faced harassment based on her sex; (3) “the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile (or abusive) environment”; and (4) there
is a causal link between the harassment and the institution. Feminist Majority Found.
v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 686 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d
686, 695 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc)).
69. E.g., N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 531.
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which courts continue to rely on in analyzing Title IX’s meaning and purpose.72 Since that decision, courts
have repeatedly acknowledged Title IX’s protection for employees.73
1. Enforcing Title IX Through the Department of Education and
Implied Private Right of Action
While Title IX, unlike Title VII, contains no explicit private right
of action, the Supreme Court recognized an implied private right of
action under Title IX in 1979.74 In Cannon v. University of Chicago, a
female medical school applicant sued two private universities for sex
discrimination alleging she was denied admission on the basis of her
sex.75 Reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court held that “[n]ot
only the words and history of Title IX, but also its subject matter and
underlying purposes, counsel implication of a cause of action in favor
of private victims of discrimination.”76
The Court further extended Title IX’s reach in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education.77 In that case, the Court held that the Title
protected against retaliation, even though the statutory language did
not address that type of claim.78 It grounded this holding in its previous Title IX caselaw which the Court said had “defined the contours of

72. Id. Title VI was aimed at ending race discrimination in education, and Title
IX’s statutory design was modeled after Title VI. Zehrt, supra note 19, at 712–15. Title
IX’s text is, in fact, almost identical to Title VI’s. While Title VI requires that “[n]o person
in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin . . . be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, Title IX requires that “[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex . . . be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Moreover,
because Title VI also explicitly provides for protection from discrimination in the education employment context, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
acknowledged Title IX’s protection for education employees in 1975. Zehrt, supra note
19, at 714.
73. E.g., Doe v. Brown Univ., 896 F.3d 127, 130 (1st Cir. 2018) (“[T]he Court has
recognized this right of action extends to student employees . . . .”); Le Strange v. Consol. Rail Corp., 687 F.2d 767, 769–70 (3d Cir. 1982) (applying the North Haven holding
to the Rehabilitation Act in holding that Act also covers employment discrimination);
see also Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005) (extending Title
IX protection to a high school teacher/coach).
74. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
75. Id. at 680.
76. Id. at 709.
77. 544 U.S. at 171.
78. Id. at 183.
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[Title IX’s] right of action.”79 The Court cited Cannon, as well as Franklin v. Gwinnet County Public Schools,80 which authorized monetary
damages as a private remedy;81 Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School District,82 which acknowledged deliberate indifference as the
basis for a cause of action under the Title; and Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education,83 which brought sexual harassment by a student
under Title IX’s purview.84 Because this right of action was implied,
not explicit, it follows that unlike Title VII, Title IX does not include a
requirement that private litigants exhaust administrative remedies
before filing a lawsuit in court.85 Title IX suits are thus friendlier to
plaintiffs, who may bring suit in court without jumping through various hoops or withstanding long waiting periods, as required under Title VII.
2. Title IX’s Relationship with the Spending Clause
The lack of an explicit private right of action in Title IX’s text follows given its passage under Congress’s spending power.86 The
Spending Clause provides that “[t]he Congress shall have the Power
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the Common Defense and general welfare of the
United States.”87 While today the spending power is thought of as one
of Congress’s enumerated powers,88 the Founders disagreed about
whether that was the case. Famous rivals Alexander Hamilton and
James Madison disagreed over the limits of Congress’s spending
power.89 Madison argued that the power was limited by Congress’s
79. Id. at 173.
80. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
81. Punitive damages are generally unavailable under Title IX, consistent with
contract damages and Title VI caselaw holding the same. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536
U.S. 181, 187–90 (2002).
82. 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998).
83. 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
84. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005).
85. E.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 707 n.41 (1979) (“[I]ndividual suits
are [not] inappropriate in advance of exhaustion of administrative remedies.”); Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 255 (2009) (“Title IX has no administrative exhaustion requirement . . . .”).
86. See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 181.
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
88. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 10, 16 (1994) (detailing the extent of the spending power).
89. See David E. Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of the Federal Spending Power, 52
S.D. L. REV. 496, 500 (2007) (summarizing Madison and Hamilton’s disagreement and
citing Congressional testimony, reports, and personal letters).
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other enumerated powers, meaning Congress could use its power of
the purse only to advance initiatives made possible by some other
Constitutional grant of authority.90 This interpretation would have
limited the Spending Clause’s leverage considerably. Hamilton, on the
other hand, argued the Spending Clause constituted an enumerated
power all its own, giving Congress the ability to regulate broadly, so
long as it did so through its distribution of federal funding.91
Hamilton’s position formed the basis for the “contract thesis” of
the Spending Clause,92 a viewpoint that has now been widely
adopted.93 Spending Clause legislation generally conditions the receipt of federal funds on some specific actions or requirements on the
part of the funded party.94 The contract thesis thus posits that this relationship between the government and the funded party is contractual in nature and the Supreme Court has held that “legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a
contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with
federally imposed conditions.”95 It further clarified that “Congress
may fix terms on which it shall disburse federal money to the States.”96
The spending power is not unlimited, however. In South Dakota
v. Dole, the Supreme Court established four requirements for valid
Spending Clause legislation97: (1) it “must be in pursuit of the general

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923) (noting that the
State of Massachusetts was not harmed by congressional appropriations which states
could accept or reject as they pleased); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937)
(“The conception of the spending power advocated by Hamilton . . . has prevailed over
that of Madison . . . .”); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (holding that
Congress could use its spending power to regulate underage alcohol consumption);
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186–87 (2002) (summarizing the Court’s history of
construing Spending Clause legislation as contractual in nature).
94. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. In Pennhurst, the court had begun to enumerate limits on Congress’s spending
power, though the test is now more commonly associated with South Dakota v. Dole.
See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25 (“The crucial inquiry . . . is . . . whether Congress spoke so
clearly that we can fairly say that the State could make an informed choice.”).
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welfare;”98 (2) its conditions must be unambiguous, so states are “cognizant of the consequences of their participation;”99 (3) it must be related or “germane” to the federal interest in the program;100 and (4) it
must not be barred by any other constitutional provision.101 So long
as the Dole test is met, Congress may create policy broadly for the “objects of government.”102
Title IX’s statutory enforcement mechanism also evidences its
contractual nature. Title IX expressly adopted procedural provisions
from Title VI, the legislation on which Title IX was based.103 Those provisions require funded parties to keep certain compliance reports and
provide information to Department of Education officials and the Title’s beneficiaries.104 Students and employees may file a charge of discrimination with the Department of Education within 180 days of the
alleged discriminatory act.105 The Department then investigates the
charge106 and attempts to resolve the matter through “informal
means.“107 If resolution through informal means is impossible, the Department may suspend or terminate the federal funding.108 This enforcement mechanism thus resembles the dissolution of a contractual
relationship: the funded party has breached the agreement by engaging in prohibited conduct (by discriminating on the basis of sex) and
the funding party thus discontinues performance (by withdrawing
funding) as well. Title VII’s duty does not share these same contractlike conditions—instead the employer must abide by Title VII’s requirements or be liable to its employees.109
Even when suing under the implied private right of action, Title
IX’s character as a Spending Clause contract is still evident, as courts
have interpreted Dole’s notice requirement to be relevant to damages

98. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. The court has also alluded to a fifth requirement: in order to be enforceable, the scheme must not be coercive. See id. at 211.
102. See Engdahl, supra note 88.
103. 34 C.F.R. § 106.81 (2020) (“The procedural provisions applicable to title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are hereby adopted and incorporated herein by reference.”).
104. 34 C.F.R. § 100.6(a)–(d) (2020).
105. Id. § 100.7(b).
106. Id. § 100.7(c).
107. Id. § 100.7(d).
108. Id. § 100.8(a).
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)–(g).
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awards for individual litigants.110 Because a funding recipient understands its obligations under the Act, any violations are considered intentional.111 The fact that violations are considered intentional opens
the door to greater damages awards than are available to private litigants under Title VII.112 In contrast with Title VII, where a litigant may
recover for both intentional discrimination and discrimination caused
by disparate impact,113 monetary recovery for unintentional discrimination is difficult if not impossible under Title IX.114 And again, because a court has never held that a private Title IX litigant must exhaust her administrative remedies, she could sue prior to the
conclusion of the Department of Education investigation, or even
prior to filing a charge with the department at all.115
3. Third-Party Beneficiaries May Enforce Spending Clause
Contracts
As noted above, the Supreme Court has consistently treated
Spending Clause statutes as contracts with funded parties.116 This application of contract doctrine has extended to treating beneficiaries of
the federal funding as third-party beneficiaries of those contractual
relationships.117 This acknowledgment demonstrates that the Court
110. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287 (1998).
111. Id. at 287 (“[W]here discrimination is unintentional, ‘it is surely not obvious
that the grantee was aware that it was administering the program in violation of the
[condition].’” (quoting Guardians Ass’n v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 598
(1983))).
112. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 74 (1992) (“[R]emedies
were limited under [] Spending Clause statutes when the alleged violation was unintentional. Respondents and the United States maintain that this presumption should
apply equally to intentional violations. We disagree. The point of not permitting monetary damages for an unintentional violation is that the receiving entity of federal
funds lacks notice that it will be liable for a monetary award.” (citing Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981))).
113. See supra notes 32–35 (outlining Title VII’s recovery for intentional discrimination and disparate impact).
114. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74 (“The point of not permitting monetary damages for
an unintentional violation is that the receiving entity of federal funds lacks notice that
it will be liable for a monetary award.” (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 451 U.S. at
17)).
115. Cf. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 707–08 n.41 (1979) (“[W]e are not
persuaded that individual suits are inappropriate in advance of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Because the individual complainants cannot assure themselves that
the administrative process will reach a decision on their complaints within a reasonable time, it makes little sense to require exhaustion.”).
116. Supra notes 89–96.
117. E.g., Miree v. DeKalb Cnty., 433 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1977); Cannon, 441 U.S. 677.
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sees private enforcement of Spending Clause contracts as integral to
their success and third-party beneficiary enforcement of Title IX
should be no exception.
The Supreme Court first acknowledged purported third-party
beneficiaries’ interests in enforcing Spending Clause laws in Miree v.
DeKalb County.118 Shortly after that decision, the Court engaged in a
robust analysis of whether private litigants may enforce Title IX’s contract as third-party beneficiaries in Cannon v. University of Chicago.119
In recognizing Title IX’s implied right of action, the Cannon Court applied an existing test for whether Congress intended a private remedy.120 Originating in Cort v. Ash, the test asks:
(1) “whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class of which
the plaintiff is a member”121 (2) whether there is any indication of legislative
intent to create a private remedy122 (3) whether implication of such a remedy is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme,123
and (4) “whether implying a federal remedy is inappropriate because the
subject matter involves an area basically of concern to the States.”124

In applying the test’s fourth factor, the Court arguably dispensed
with the issue over which Hamilton and Madison had disagreed.125
The Court held that the factor was satisfied because the federal government had been protecting citizens from discrimination since the
Civil War and that this was not a State or extraneous matter because
“expenditure of federal funds [] provides the justification for [Title
IX].126 As to the first factor, the Court expressed no doubt that the
plaintiff was “clearly a member of that class for whose special benefit
the statute was enacted.”127 Critically, this aligns with the common law
in most states, which provides that “[t]he test of the third party’s
rights is [] whether the parties to the contract intended that a third
person should receive a benefit enforceable by the courts.”128

118. 433 U.S. at 32–33.
119. 441 U.S. at 694–99.
120. Id. at 677.
121. Id. at 689.
122. Id. at 694.
123. Id. at 703.
124. Id. at 708 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80–85 (1975), distinguished on other
grounds by Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 44 U.S. 242 (1979)).
125. See id. at 708–09; see also supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text (explaining the different historical views on the Spending Clause).
126. Cannon, 433 U.S. at 678.
127. Id. at 694.
128. 16 AM. JUR. 2d Proof of Facts § 55 (2020).
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s statement that the plaintiff in
Cannon was “clearly” a beneficiary of Title IX follows closely from the
Title’s text which explicitly references the Act’s beneficiaries.129 The
procedural safeguards for the Title require funding recipients to
“make available to participants, beneficiaries, and other interested
persons” information about the funding received.”130 Thus, the funded
party and the beneficiary are not necessarily one and the same. Similarly, the key language most often cited explaining Title IX’s mandate
does not center on the monetary benefit for the funded party. Rather
it centers on the protection Title IX affords participants in federally
funded education programs or activities.131
The Supreme Court further demonstrated the important role of
third-party beneficiaries in Spending Clause contracts in Blessing v.
Freestone.132 Justice Scalia clarified:
The State promises to provide certain services to private individuals, in exchange for which the Federal Government promises to give the State funds.
In contract law, when such an arrangement is made (A promises to pay B
money, in exchange for which B promises to provide services to C), the person who receives the benefit of the exchange of promises between two others
(C) is called a third-party beneficiary.133

In Blessing, the Court addressed whether one section of the Social Security Act gave rise to “individually-enforceable rights,” such that a litigant could sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on deprivation of Social
Security benefits.134 While the Court declined to hold one way or the
other in that instance,135 it highlighted that the focus falls on Congressional intent and suggested it would be difficult to show “that allowing
§ 1983 actions to go forward . . . would be inconsistent with Congress’
carefully tailored scheme.”136
129. Cannon, 433 U.S. at 694; 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
130. 34 C.F.R. § 100.6 (2020). Recall that Title IX regulations incorporated Title IV’s
procedural provisions by reference. Id. § 106.81 (2020).
131. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
132. 520 U.S. 329 (1997). Blessing concerned the Social Security Act, which was
passed pursuant to the spending power. See id. at 332–35; Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619, 640 (1937) (noting that Congress bears the discretion to distinguish between
aims under the Spending Clause).
133. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 346–48.
135. The Ninth Circuit below held that the provision of the act in question, Title IVD, created “enforceable right[s].” See id. at 338–39 (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 68 F.3d
1141 (1995)). But the Supreme Court explained that such a finding was “paint[ed] with
too broad a brush.” Id. at 342. The Court held that the alleged rights must be “identif[ied] with particularity.” Id. Based on the Ninth Circuit’s lacking analysis and other
factors, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case. Id. at 349.
136. Id. at 346 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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Other examples help illustrate this focus on Congressional intent
in defining the role of third-party enforcement of Spending Clause
funding law. For example, the Medicaid program was passed pursuant
to Congress’s spending power and includes an enforcement mechanism similar to Title IX’s.137 Although Medicaid’s text does not include
an explicit private right of action, courts recognize private litigants’
right to enforce its compliance through claims brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.138 In assessing whether private enforcement was appropriate,
the Sixth Circuit asked whether “the statutory section was intended to
benefit the putative plaintiff.”139 Because Medicaid is designed to benefit individuals, the court reasoned that those individuals had a cognizable interest in Medicaid’s enforcement and, thus, had standing to
sue.140 While Spending Clause contracts bind only the funded party
and the federal government, certain individuals’ interests in those
contracts are strong enough that they may be considered third-parties
to the agreements. Such a vested interest in a contract also justifies
those beneficiaries’ ability to enforce the contracts.
Given Title IX’s clear purpose of protecting all persons in educational institution settings, it follows that those persons should be able
to enforce Title IX’s provisions, just as Medicaid beneficiaries may enforce its provisions. This status as third-party beneficiaries to Title
IX’s contract is distinct from any similar protective status educational
institution employees enjoy through Title VII’s coverage, a difference
that none of the courts implicated in the circuit split have adequately
analyzed. Given the two separate types of duty owed to those employees, they should be allowed to enforce both duties and hold their employers to account under all Congressionally created and mandated
means.

137. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a) (“[T]he Secretary . . . shall pay to each State . . . .”). Even
though Medicaid legislation was passed as part of the Social Security Act, see id. §
1396(a), this example still helps to illustrate how courts grapple with the question of
third-party beneficiaries.
138. While the Supreme Court in Blessing said the Ninth Circuit’s general finding
of an enforceable right in Title IV-D of the Social Security Act was inadequate, 520 U.S.
at 348, in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n, the Court found a specific enforceable right
that the states will “provide reimbursement for the ‘reasonable cost’ of hospital services actually provided.” 496 U.S. 498, 505, 512 (1990) (quoting Medicaid Act, Pub. L.
No. 89-97, § 1902(13)(B), 79 Stat. 286, 345–6 (1965)); see also Westside Mothers v.
Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 863 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding privately enforceable right).
139. Westside Mothers, 289 F.3d at 862 (citing Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341).
140. Id. at 863 (“First, the provisions were clearly intended to benefit the putative
plaintiffs, children who are eligible for the screening and treatment services.”).
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C. THE LIBERAL RULES OF ALTERNATIVE PLEADING
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) favor bringing concurrent claims in a single lawsuit,141 a preference which many states’
rules also share.142 Rule 8(d)(2) states that a plaintiff may state two or
more claims alternatively or hypothetically and that if either claim is
sufficient, the pleading itself is sufficient.143 The rule goes on to indicate that the claims may be inconsistent with one another.144 Rule 8
further makes clear that complaints may seek multiple different types
of relief, including alternative relief145 and U.S. courts have acknowledged the abolition of the election of remedies doctrine.146
The FRCP’s liberal pleading rules are a departure from historical
common law pleading standards, which typically required plaintiffs to
proceed on a single theory of recovery.147 Today’s more relaxed standards help promote efficiency since a single lawsuit can address multiple theories, as well as fairness, as plaintiffs do not automatically lose
their day in court just because they bring an erroneous legal theory
for their claim.148 Rule 8(d)(2)’s explicit acceptance of both alternative
and hypothetical pleading also demonstrates the drafters’ desire to
make the legal system accessible even before a party knows all of the
facts required to prevail on a claim.149
141. See infra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
142. See Roy W. McDonald, Alternative Pleading in the United States: I, 52 COLUM. L.
REV. 443, 445–47 (1952) (detailing states with similar alternative pleading rules and
practices).
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(2).
144. Id. at 8(d)(3).
145. Id. at 8(a)(3).
146. The election of remedies doctrine provided that a party must choose between
conflicting remedies, waiving the right to sue for the other. See Election of Remedies,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). See also sources cited infra note 147.
147. See 5 ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE, & A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1282 (3d ed. 2021); Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson Wax Dev.
Corp., 908 F.2d 1363, 1371 (7th Cir 1990) (“It was essential [at common law] that a
party be forbidden to plead in the alternative, for that would generate two or more
issues for trial. He must therefore elect his remedy . . . . Common law pleading was superseded long ago, however—in the federal courts by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which expressly abolish election of remedies.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(2)).
148. MILLER ET AL., supra note 147.
149. It follows that where the facts are lacking, claims may be “hypothetical” in that
there simply is not enough evidence yet to prove the elements of the claim. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Lobrano, suggests that failing to plead a hypothetical alternative
claim may result in claim preclusion later on. 695 F.3d 758, 765 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d) explicitly contemplates this type of hypothetical alternative pleading . . . . [Plaintiff] needed to recognize the very real possibility that the
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that “the distinctly separate nature of [] contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence.”150 Allowing each type of claim to be concurrently
pursued in the same action comports with the FRCP.151
Ultimately, the differences between Title VII and Title IX are significant despite both laws’ aiming at similar ends. While Title VII requires exhausting administrative remedies, a process that may take
several months for public employees to complete, Title IX includes no
such requirement. In addition, Title IX’s passage under Congress’s
spending power sets it apart from Title VII. Title IX’s contractual nature provides an important analytical framework to employ when addressing whether Title VII, the foremost employment discrimination
law, preempts Title IX’s protection of educational institution employees. These differences indicate that eligible employees should be allowed to take advantage of the legal system’s preference for alternative pleading and file both claims in a single suit if they choose.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT CAUSES CONFUSION DESPITE CONGRESS’S
CLEAR INTENTION TO BROADLY ADDRESS SEX DISCRIMINATION
IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Despite the differences between Title VII and Title IX, the Federal
Circuits have split about whether an aggrieved employee of a Title IXfunded institution must remediate her grievance through Title VII or
if she may do so through Title IX instead.152 While the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, covered in Subsection A, have held that her only remedial avenue is a Title VII claim,153 the First, Third, Fourth, and Sixth

covenants would be declared unenforceable and plead accordingly [at the time of
pleading its other claims].”).
150. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 50 (1974) (addressing a union
member’s concurrent claims: a contract claim arising under a collective bargaining
agreement and a Title VII discrimination claim).
151. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(2); infra Part III.A.1.
152. The relevant circuit court cases are Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881 (1st
Cir. 1988); Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2017); Preston v. Virginia
ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994); Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751
(5th Cir. 1995); Ivan v. Kent State Univ., No. 93.00779, 1996 WL 422496, at *2 (6th Cir.
July 26, 1996); Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1996), abrogated
on other grounds by Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009).
153. Lakoski, 66 F.3d 751; Waid, 91 F.3d 857.
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Circuits, covered in Subsection B, have each held that such an employee may choose to sue under Title VII, Title IX, or both.154 Subsection C establishes that this circuit split is particularly consequential
because of the huge number of employees who fall under the purview
of both Title VII and Title IX,155 and because Congress has repeatedly
acknowledged the importance of ending sex discrimination in education, a problem that has persisted over the decades between Title IX’s
passage and the present day.156
A. CIRCUITS HOLDING THAT TITLE VII PREEMPTS TITLE IX IGNORE
IMPORTANT TITLE IX PRECEDENT
The Fifth Circuit was the first to decide that Title VII preempts
Title IX in Lakoski v. James.157 As noted earlier, Lakoski alleged that her
repeated denial of tenure amounted to sex discrimination, and she
sued under Title IX.158 The Fifth Circuit held that Title VII was Lakoski’s only avenue for relief and dismissed her claim.159 The court based
its decision on: (1) Title IX’s lack of administrative scheme required
for bringing claims; (2) prior Title VII caselaw; and (3) Title VII’s legislative history.160
The Fifth Circuit attached great weight to the fact that Title VII
included detailed administrative requirements for litigants to bring
claims under the statute,161 while Title IX did not.162 The court reasoned that the lack of such an administrative mechanism indicated
that Congress did not create Title IX to remediate private wrongs.163
Instead, the court found that allowing employment discrimination
claims under Title IX “would disrupt a carefully balanced remedial

154. Lipsett, 864 F.2d 881; Mercy Cath., 850 F.3d 545; Preston, 31 F.3d 203; Ivan,
1996 WL 422496.
155. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
156. See infra Part II.C.
157. 66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995).
158. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
159. 66 F.3d at 754–57.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 753.
162. Id.; see also supra note 85 and accompanying text. While complainants under
Title IX may notify the Department of Education of the alleged discrimination, it is not
required. Supra note 85.
163. Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754–55. While the Lakoski court did admit that the Supreme Court had found private rights of action under Title IX, it nevertheless suggested
that cases like Franklin and Cannon were inapposite because those cases do not “add
up to an implied private right of action for damages under Title IX for employment
discrimination.” Id. at 754.
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scheme for redressing employment discrimination by employers” like
the “congressionally mandated procedures of Title VII.”164
The Lakoski court also relied on prior Title VII caselaw in deciding
that Congress did not intend for Title IX to provide an avenue for employees to bypass Title VII’s administrative requirements.165 For example, in Novotny, the Supreme Court held that Title VII preempted
42 U.S.C. § 1985 claims because “[i]f a violation of Title VII could be
asserted through § 1985[], a complainant could . . . bypass the administrative process.”166 The Lakoski court found that the same logic dictates that Title VII should preempt Title IX claims in the context of a
sex discrimination claim.167
The Fifth Circuit also explained that only a few months before
Congress passed Title IX, Congress closed a loophole in Title VII which
had exempted educational institutions from its coverage.168 The court
thus concluded that because educational institutions were no longer
exempt from Title VII by the time Title IX was passed, Title IX was no
longer necessary to address sex discrimination against educational institution employees.169
Interestingly, the Lakoski decision did tacitly acknowledge the
difference in the type of claims each Title created.170 While the court
maintained that the rights protected by Titles VII and IX were the
same, it acknowledged that the remedies were different, with Title VII
providing “administrative and judicial redress for employment discrimination” and Title IX allowing for termination of funding.171 This
suggests the court was at least aware that the Titles bind educational
institution employers to two different types of legal duties. Still, the
164. Id. at 754.
165. Id. at 755–58. The court in Waid v. Merrill Area Public Schools relied on similar
reasoning in holding that Title VII preempted a Title IX employment discrimination
claim. 91 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009).
166. Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 755 (quoting Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny,
442 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1979)); see also Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 828–
35 (1976) (holding that Title VII is the exclusive judicial remedy for discrimination
claims brought by federal employees).
167. Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 755. The Seventh Circuit saw Novotny the same way. Waid,
91 F.3d at 862.
168. Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 757.
169. Id. (“The passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which
removed Title VII’s exemption for educational institutions as well as extending Title
VII’s coverage to state and local government employees, obviated the need for the Education Amendments to close the loophole in Title VII.”).
170. Id.
171. Id.

2021]

TITLE VII AND TITLE IX

503

Lakoski court effectively ignored the large body of Title IX caselaw that
established individual enforcement,172 cases like Cannon,173 Jackson,174 Franklin,175 and Davis.176
The Seventh Circuit also addressed this question in Waid v. Merrill Area Public Schools.177 The court relied in part on Lakoski178 in
holding that “if Congress intended that one of the statutory schemes
should be the exclusive way to vindicate a right, then plaintiffs are required to sue only under that statute.”179 The court went on to note
that “Title VII provides a comprehensive statutory scheme for protecting rights against discrimination in employment.”180 But the court did
not address how “comprehensive” automatically indicates “exclusive.”181 The next Subsection will address the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ opposition on this question, as four sister circuits have disagreed about Title VII’s exclusivity.
B. DESPITE REACHING THE CORRECT OUTCOME, CIRCUITS ALLOWING
CONCURRENT TITLE VII AND TITLE IX CLAIMS FAIL TO ADDRESS THE WAYS
TITLE VII AND TITLE IX CLAIMS DIFFER IN KIND
As noted above, the First, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuit Courts
have held that Title VII is not the sole remedy available to employees
of Title IX-funded institutions complaining of sex discrimination.182
Those Circuits have held that these employees may choose to bring a
Title IX claim instead, or to simultaneously bring claims under both
Titles. The Third Circuit’s decision in Mercy Catholic provides the most

172. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
173. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (allowing private enforcement of
Title IX by a student denied admission on the basis of sex).
174. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (finding individual
enforcement of retaliation actionable under Title IX).
175. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (authorizing monetary damages to private litigants under Title IX).
176. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (allowing private enforcement of sexual harassment under Title IX).
177. 91 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009).
178. Id. at 861.
179. Id. at 861 (citing Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366,
378 (1979)).
180. Waid, 91 F.3d at 861–62.
181. Id. at 861. Presumably the Waid court believed the same as the Lakoski court,
namely that Title VII’s complicated administrative requirements indicated Congress
intended such exclusivity. See, e.g., Novotny, 442 U.S. at 372–77.
182. Supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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robust analysis of this question, relying heavily on caselaw interpreting Title VII and Title IX.183
The Mercy Catholic decision found that an individual employee
may seek redress under Title IX.184 The court focused on key Title IX
Supreme Court cases including Cannon, North Haven, Franklin, and
Jackson in finding that Title IX covered the defendant teaching hospital185 and in holding that a private right of action under Title IX claim
was available to the plaintiff.186 Citing North Haven, the Third Circuit
explained that Congress was silent as to whether Title IX could provide an alternative to Title VII for relief from employment discrimination.187 Thus, the court concluded private recovery under Title IX was
not barred.188
The Mercy Catholic court argued in addition that Title VII caselaw
bolstered this conclusion. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff with a cognizable Title VII
claim could likewise bring the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.189 The
Mercy Catholic Court stated that “despite Title VII’s ‘range’ and ‘design

183. Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center provides the best survey of arguments
on this side of the circuit split. See 850 F.3d 545, 555 (3d Cir. 2017). In Ivan, the Sixth
Circuit dealt with a slightly different application of the question. Ivan v. Kent State
Univ., No. 93.00779, 1996 WL 422496, at *1 (6th Cir. July 26, 1996). There, the plaintiff
was a PhD candidate and alleged sex discrimination as an employee under Title VII,
and as a student under Title IX. Id. It seems the court thus viewed the claims as sufficiently different, despite applying the same substantive standards to the claims, that it
did not engage deeply with the real question at issue in this circuit split. See id. at *2.
The Lipsett and Preston decisions actually predate the real start of this disagreement
among the circuits. See Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988); Preston v.
Virginia ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, both
decisions are still relevant and cited in discussions of the split because each circuit allowed a Title IX employment discrimination claim in lieu of or in addition to a Title VII
claim, tacitly acknowledging that Title VII does not preempt employment claims
brought under Title IX. See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 914–15; Preston, 31 F.3d at 208.
184. Mercy Cath., 850 F.3d at 560–63.
185. The plaintiff in Mercy Catholic was a medical student completing her residency at defendant hospital. Id. at 550. Because of medical residents’ somewhat unique
status as both medical students and employee-doctors, defendant argued that it was
not liable under Title IX. Id. at 552.
186. Id. at 562–63 (citing North Haven and Jackson in arguing that Title IX covers
persons, a broad term that must include employees).
187. Id. at 562.
188. Id.; N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 536 n.26 (1982) (“[Concurrent
enforcement was a] policy consideration [] for Congress to weigh, and we cannot ignore the language and history of Title IX even were we to disagree with the legislative
choice.”).
189. 421 U.S. 454, 455 (1975).
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as a comprehensive solution’ for ‘invidious discrimination in employment’ . . . a private-sector employee ‘clearly is not deprived of other
remedies’ and isn’t ‘limited to Title VII in his search for relief.’”190 Similarly, the Court stated that “Title VII ‘manifests a congressional intent
to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both
Title VII and other applicable’ federal statutes.”191 Taken as a whole,
the court argued that Title VII did not preempt Title IX employment
discrimination claims and that courts on the other side of the split had
failed to follow governing Title VII and IX caselaw.192 Still, the court
did not fully address the fact that the two Titles differ fundamentally
in kind.
While the Third Circuit did discuss Title IX’s character as Spending Clause legislation, it did not fully engage with how or whether that
authority should impact its analysis.193 Nevertheless, the court
thought it important to mention Title IX’s contractual nature and its
express enforcement through funding withdrawal or reduction,194
perhaps to emphasize the evolution of the law to include private enforcement.195 Thus, while the Fifth and Seventh Circuits thought Title
VII was plainly the only remedy for sex discrimination in employment,
the Mercy Catholic court provided careful analysis to refute that holding. While Mercy Catholic included in-depth discussion of Title VII’s
intent when it came to rights to relief, a closer look at Congress’s purpose behind enacting Title IX provides further aid in settling this split
and suggests allowing choice of claims or simultaneous claims under
both Titles will better achieve Congress’s goals.
C. CONGRESSIONAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SEX DISCRIMINATION IN
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
This circuit split is of particular circumstance both because of the
vast numbers of people it affects, but also because Congress has explicitly acknowledged the problem of sex discrimination in educational institutions. Employment discrimination in schools also has
190. Mercy Cath., 850 F.3d at 560 (quoting Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459). Note that contrary to the Fifth and Seventh Circuits suggestion that “comprehensive” means “exclusive,” supra notes 180–81, the Mercy Catholic and Johnson courts held the opposite
way.
191. See Mercy Cath., 850 F.3d at 560 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974)).
192. Id. at 563.
193. Id. at 552.
194. Id.
195. See supra Part I.B.1 (detailing the expansion of a private right of action in Title
IX claims).
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snowballing effects, harming both the discriminated-against employee as well as the student bystanders.196 During Congressional
hearings about House Resolution 16098,197 widely understood to be
the precursor to Title IX, “testimony documented widespread sex discrimination in the employment of women in educational institutions.”198 In addition, the testimony included “statistical evidence documenting a disparity among women in professional occupations, as
well as a disparity in salary and rank among faculty at universities.”199
The hearings also demonstrated that women tended to hold lowerpaying, non-tenured positions, while men tended to hold more prestigious roles.200 Advocates for sex discrimination legislation feared
that this discrepancy would signal “to children that the teaching of
younger children is for women, but that leadership in education and
training of older youth and adults is for men.”201 This observation is
particularly important because it suggests that sex discrimination in
education causes multiple harms; harm to the discriminated-against
employee, and harm to students’ understanding of their place in society. While the legislative history of Title IX itself is relatively scant,202
the history that does exist similarly demonstrates Congress’s concern
about sex discrimination in educational settings in particular.203
Congress has repeatedly acknowledged Title IX’s role in advancing equity in the educational setting while making clear that the problem it was enacted to address is far from solved. In 1997, on the
twenty-fifth anniversary of Title IX’s passage, sixty-one congresspeople cosponsored a resolution to acknowledge the Title’s importance in

196. Infra notes 200–01 and accompanying text.
197. H.R. 16098 was introduced as an amendment to Title VI, designed to expand
that Title to outlaw sex discrimination in any federally funded program. 143 CONG. REC.
11,874–75 (1997) (statement of Rep. Bonior).
198. Zehrt, supra note 19, at 733 (citing Discrimination Against Women: Hearings
on Section 805 of H.R. 16098 Before Spec. Subcomm. on Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ.
and Lab., 91st Cong. 1 (1970)).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 734 (internal quotations omitted).
202. Title IX was enacted as a floor amendment to the Education Amendments Act
of 1972, and thus produced no committee hearings or reports. See Zehrt, supra note
19, at 741. For a detailed discussion of Title IX and H.R. 16098’s legislative history, see
Zehrt, supra note 19.
203. Id. at 742 (noting Title IX’s sponsor’s reporting on the number of discrimination claims filed against colleges and universities); see also 143 CONG. REC. 11,874–76
(1997) (statement of Rep. Bonior) (detailing the various attempts at sex-discrimination legislation that led to Title IX).
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making significant progress toward equity in the educational arena.204
Representative Bonior’s remarks highlighted that Title IX was intended to help “establish a norm” that girls and women knew they
could “be doctors and lawyers and Presidents of the United States.”205
Yet despite progress towards this goal, Title IX remains unenforced in
some places,206 and “there is still much work to be done if the promise
of [T]itle IX is to be fulfilled.”207
More than twenty years after that resolution, sex discrimination
in education continues. In 2019, thirty-four senators and four congresspeople cosponsored a resolution reaffirming Title IX’s importance in ending sex discrimination in federally funded educational
institutions.208 The resolution highlighted numerous disparities in education outcomes, as well as employment-related issues in education
including that while “44 percent of all National Collegiate Athletic Association Division I, Division II, and Division III student athletes are
women . . . only 11 percent of the athletic directors of Division I sports
are women.”209 The resolution seemed to draw on similar concerns
raised during committee hearings for H.R. 16098: that sex disparities
in educational institutions have some causal relationship with disparities in other fields as well, perhaps because of a lack of role modeling
or representation for girls and women. The resolution cited specific
disparities in STEM210 fields, including that “women earn only . . . 19
percent of computing degrees; . . . 20 percent of engineering degrees;
and . . . 42 percent of mathematics degrees.”211 It further noted that
although women constitute fifty percent of law school graduates since
1998, they account for less than twenty-three percent of partners at
major law firms.212 The resolution flatly stated that “women continue
to experience sexual harassment and assault . . . in the workplace.”213
204. 143 CONG. REC. 11,874 (1997) (statement of Rep. Bonior).
205. Id. at 11,869.
206. Id.; see also Maggie Mertens, The Title IX Loophole That Hurts NCAA Women’s
Teams, ATLANTIC (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/archive/
2021/04/march-madness-could-spark-title-ix-reckoning/618483 [https://perma.cc/
G572-FTWC] (noting what amounts to a loophole for the NCAA itself to sidestep Title
IX’s coverage).
207. 143 CONG. REC. 11,876 (1997).
208. Murray, Slotkin Lead Colleagues, supra note 66.
209. Id.
210. STEM stands for Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math. See Science,
Technology, Engineering, and Math, Including Computer Science, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC.,
https://www.ed.gov/stem [https://perma.cc/9ZQ3-85QM].
211. Murray, Slotkin Lead Colleagues, supra note 66.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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These statistics are not significant merely for their raw numbers, but
also for the broader reality that educational environments send all
kinds of signals to students about who or what they are capable of being and doing in the future.214
The resolution also emphasized a twelve percent increase in reports of sexual harassment and assault between 2017 and 2018,215 as
well as a fifty percent increase in Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) lawsuits in 2018.216 Lastly, the resolution returned to Title IX’s original, broad language, repeating that “no federally funded educational institution shall discriminate against any person on the basis of sex”217 again highlighting that Title IX protects
students and employees, consistent with its goal to reduce sex discrimination in educational environments. Holding that Title VII
preempts Title IX’s employment coverage is antithetical to Congress’s
clear concern about the effects of sex discrimination in schools.
The courts implicated in the circuit split have, thus far, failed to
fully address Congress’s intent behind enacting Title IX. Instead, they
have focused more on what Congress intended for Title VII, and in the
process have reached contradictory results. This contradiction is troubling because Congress has clearly remained concerned about sex discrimination in the intervening years since Title IX’s passage. Yet the
Lakoski and Waid decisions218 give that concern short shrift, holding
that Title VII is sufficient to address it. The following Part will establish why eligible litigants should be able to choose Title IX instead of
Title VII, or both concurrently, in seeking redress for sex discrimination. This solution is consistent with the differing legal duties each Title created, the legal system’s treatment of multiple claims arising
from the same conduct, and it also acknowledges Congress’s deep apprehension over sex discrimination in schools.
III. EMPLOYEES OF FEDERALLY FUNDED EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS SHOULD BE ABLE TO FILE SUIT ALLEGING SEX
DISCRIMINATION UNDER EITHER TITLE IX, TITLE VII, OR BOTH
SIMULTANEOUSLY
214. Infra Part III.D.
215. Murray, Slotkin Lead Colleagues, supra note 66.
216. Id.
217. Id. (emphasis added).
218. The Lakoski and Waid courts both held that Title VII preempts Title IX’s coverage for educational institution employees. Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 755 (5th
Cir. 1995); Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 1996), abrogated
on other grounds by Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009).
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The Supreme Court should settle this circuit split219 by holding
that Title VII does not preempt Title IX, allowing eligible litigants to
choose their preferred remedial avenue or file suit concurrently under
both Titles. This solution acknowledges that Title VII and Title IX
claims differ significantly in kind, the former sounding in tort, the latter sounding in contract. In addition, the Court has already acknowledged private enforcement of Spending Clause contracts under other
statutes, holding that certain parties are third-party beneficiaries of
those contracts.220 Allowing for concurrent claims also aligns with
how rules of civil procedure encourage the simultaneous pleading of
contract and tort claims arising from the same conduct.
This Part will also argue that allowing suit under Title IX is especially important because of Congress’s continued acknowledgement
of sex discrimination in educational institutions and the outsized importance that those institutions play in shaping students’ visions of
themselves.
A. BECAUSE TITLE VII AND TITLE IX CLAIMS DIFFER IN KIND, EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTION EMPLOYEES SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO CHOOSE TO SUE UNDER
EITHER TITLE OR BOTH CONCURRENTLY
Title VII and Title IX impose upon federally funded educational
institutions two independent legal obligations not to discriminate on
the basis of sex. Thus, claims under these statutes arise out of breaches
of different legal duties. Consistent with common law tort and contract jurisprudence, as well as Spending Clause jurisprudence, sex discrimination plaintiffs should be allowed to pursue claims under both
laws.

219. Notably, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Lakoski. Lakoski v. Univ. Tex.
Med. Branch, 519 U.S. 947 (1996). That said, the more frequently this issue arises, and
the more circuits are forced to weigh in, the more likely the Court may be to address
it. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the average litigant would appeal to the Supreme Court given the cost and time associated with doing so. The average litigant
looking for recovery is probably more likely to accept a lower court’s holding, take
whatever relief she can get, and cease further appeals related to this issue. Thus, it may
take a special plaintiff, one whose damages are significantly greater than what Title
VII’s limits allow in recovery, to return this issue to the Court.
Alternatively, while Congress could certainly do away with this circuit split through
legislation, Congress has already spoken on this issue numerous times over the decades. See Part II.C., examining Congress’s commitment to gender equality in schools.
Thus, the Court should settle the split consistent with Congress’s clear intentions for
Title IX’s purpose and scope.
220. Supra Part I.B.3.
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1. The Statutes Impose Different Legal Duties on Employers, and
Thus Plaintiffs Should be Allowed to Enforce Both Duties Consistent
with Caselaw Governing Concurrent Contract and Tort Claims
As discussed in Part I, Title VII violations give rise to liability in
tort, while Title IX violations amount to breaches of contract.221 This
difference is a key reason why an aggrieved employee of an educational institution should be allowed to bring both claims in the same
suit, or to choose between them at her will. The remedies available
under each Title also differ. While both schemes may provide compensatory damages, Title VII damages are capped, but Title IX damages
are not.222 The fact that the same conduct might trigger claims under
both laws does not indicate they are duplicative. In fact, the texts of
each statute are typically not read in concert with one another, indicating their differences.223 Thus, while the claims may appear similar,
Title IX is interpreted as being the progeny of Title VI, not Title VII.224
The Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged the differences between both Title IX and Title VII,225 as well as Title VI and Title VII.226
The law has long recognized that putative plaintiffs may file both
tort and contract actions arising from the same set of facts. The Supreme Court acknowledged that “the remedy upon the contract does
not exclude an alternative remedy built upon the tort . . . . [A putative
plaintiff] may sue for breach of contract if he will, but also at his election in trespass on the case.”227 The Tenth Circuit acknowledged the
221. Supra Parts I.A.2, I.B.2.
222. Moreover, while punitive damages are available for certain types of Title VII
claims, they are generally unavailable for Title IX claims. See supra note 81; supra Parts
I.A.1, I.B.1.
223. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 168 (2005) (referring to
Title IX and Title VII as “vastly different statute[s]”).
224. See supra note 72 and accompanying text; see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441
U.S. 677, 694–95 (1979) (“Title IX was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 . . . . [T]he two statutes use identical language to describe the benefited class.”).
225. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 168 (referring to Title IX and Title VII as “vastly different
statute[s]”).
226. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206 n.6 (1979) (“Title VII
and Title VI, therefore, cannot be read in pari materia.”).
227. Cortes v. Balt. Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 372 (1932), superseded on other
grounds by statute, 41 Stat. 1007, as recognized in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S.
19 (1990). Similarly, in 1893 a New York court addressed a tort case arising out of a
contract between plaintiff and defendant, wherein plaintiff paid defendant to build a
drainage ditch. Unfortunately for plaintiff, the ditch was poorly constructed and instead of draining water, his property remained flooded with water. Plaintiff brought a
tort claim, alleging the work had been completed negligently. Defendant objected, arguing that plaintiff was required to bring a claim sounding in contract. The court held
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same in SCO Group, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp.228 In
SCO, the court was asked whether the existence of a contract precluded tort actions arising from conduct already contemplated by that
contract.229 The defendant in SCO alleged that the tort claim was precluded by the independent tort doctrine, but the Tenth Circuit disagreed.230 While the independent tort doctrine holds that a breach of
contract does not give rise to a tort claim “unless a legal duty independent of the contract itself has been violated,”231 if a “societal policy
or law . . . gives rise to a duty of care,” then an independent tort claim
is allowed.232
In its analysis of this issue, the SCO court highlighted other cases
wherein a plaintiff was allowed to bring a tort claim even though the
wrongful conduct was already covered by a contract provision. One
such example, Sidney Frank Importing Co. v. Beam Inc., involved a
whiskey distributor who was allowed to bring a tortious interference
with business relations claim even though tortious interference was
contemplated by an applicable contract.233 The Sidney Frank court
plainly stated that “a contracting party may be charged with a separate tort liability arising from a breach of duty distinct from, or in addition to, the breach of contract.”234 The Tenth Circuit also mentioned
Cargill, Inc. v. Sears Petroleum & Transportation Corp.,235 wherein “a
misappropriation claim survived alongside a breach of contract claim
when the breached agreement specifically governed the use of confidentially shared information . . . .”236
for plaintiff, stating: “Plaintiff’s right of action did not depend on the existence of a contract between himself and the defendant, but upon the fact that the defendant wrongfully and negligently did an act which injured the plaintiff’s property. Defendant owed
a duty to the plaintiff not to injure his property by any wrongful or negligent act of his,
while performing the contract. That duty did not necessarily depend upon or grow out
of the contract.” Fromm v. Ide, 23 N.Y.S. 56, 58 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1893) (citations omitted).
228. 879 F.3d 1062, 1077 (10th Cir. 2018).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1076–78.
231. Id. at 1076 (quoting Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R.R. Co., 516 N.E.2d
190, 193 (1987)).
232. Id.
233. Sidney Frank Importing Co. v. Beam Inc., 998 F. Supp. 2d 193, 210 (S.D.N.Y.
2014).
234. Id. (quoting Meyers v. Waverly Fabrics, 479 N.E.2d 236, 239 n.2 (1985) (per
curiam)).
235. 388 F. Supp. 2d 37, 65 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
236. SCO Grp., Inc., 879 F.3d at 1077. While the Title IX/Title VII circuit split presents the problem as if a tort action (Title VII claim) certainly exists and a contract
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In holding that the plaintiff could recover under both contract
and tort theories, the Cargill court noted that while the two claims
were “interrelated and to some degree mutually dependent” they
were distinct enough to coexist.237 The Cargill court highlighted that
the causes of action each serve to protect different interests: the confidentiality agreement in question protected unauthorized disclosure
of information, whereas the misappropriation of trade secrets action
protected the company’s commercial assets (its trade secrets).238 The
Tenth Circuit stated:
The focus is not . . . on whether the tortious conduct is separate and distinct
from the defendants’ breach of contractual duties . . . . Rather, the focus is on
whether a noncontractual duty was violated; a duty imposed on individuals
as a matter of social policy, as opposed to those imposed consensually as a
matter of contractual agreement.239

This same logic applies to Title IX and Title VII. While Title IX
gives rise to a contractual duty “imposed consensually”240 to protect
its beneficiaries—students and employees—from discriminatory
practices under the agreement, Title VII gives rise to a tort-like duty,
imposed “as a matter of social policy,”241 generally protecting the population from discriminatory employment practices. The fact that the
two claims may be “interrelated” or “mutually dependent,”242 or that
they may be triggered by the same conduct, does not dictate that one
should supersede or preempt the other. Unlike the problem contemplated by the independent tort doctrine, a putative plaintiff implicated
in this circuit split is not merely “seeking enforcement of the bargain.”243 Instead, she is seeking enforcement of her employer’s Title IX
contractual duty not to use federal funds to discriminate, as well as her
employer’s Title VII tort duty not to discriminate based on sex as a
action (Title IX claim) may exist, these cases present the inverse question: the contract
claim is undisputed and the tort claim remains in contention. This makes sense given
the relative ease of recovering punitive damages in tort actions compared to doing the
same in contract actions, representing a potential advantage to the plaintiff. See Brown
v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (“For breaches of contract standing alone,
punitive damages are generally not recoverable.”). Nevertheless, the same reasoning
for supporting concurrent contract-cum-tort claims supports the opposite as well.
237. SCO Grp., Inc., 879 F.3d at 1077.
238. Cargill, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 65.
239. SCO Grp., 879 F.3d at 1076 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Apple Recs., Inc. v.
Capitol Recs., Inc., 529 N.Y.S.2d 279, 281–82 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)).
240. Id.; see also supra Part I.B.1.
241. Id. (emphasis omitted); supra Part I.A.2.
242. Cargill, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 65.
243. SCO Grp., Inc., 879 F.3d at 1076 (quoting Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593
N.E.2d 1365, 1369 (N.Y. 1992)).
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matter of social policy. Despite their apparent interrelatedness, each
cause of action represents a distinct obligation on the part of an educational employer, and plaintiff should not be forced to forego her
rights under either law, nor should courts waive employers’ legal obligations under those laws merely because they have similar goals and
are triggered by similar facts.
Despite the fact that the claims arising under each Title may
clearly coexist because they represent two separate legal duties, the
courts involved in this circuit split have either only given this a cursory mention or have failed to address it at all. Given enough thought,
this difference could indeed be dispositive of the controversy in the
split, and courts should resolve it in favor of litigants’ ability to bring
concurrent claims.
2. Treating the Claims as Different in Kind Is Consistent with
Courts’ Treatment of Certain Individuals as Third-Party Beneficiaries
of Spending Clause Contracts
Treating the claims as different in kind is consistent with existing
caselaw. This Note has referenced numerous cases where courts
acknowledged the contractual nature of Spending Clause legislation.244 This is true not only when the government enforces the contracts through withdrawal of funding, but also when third-party beneficiaries of the contracts enforce them in court.245 Title IX should be
no different.
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) provides
meaningful contrast to Title IX and Medicaid. Medicaid’s text, detailed
in Part I, focuses on the states’ ability to provide medical assistance
“on behalf of families.”246 Courts have relied upon that text in holding
that third-party beneficiaries (those individuals Medicaid is designed

244. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (assessing the Maternity Act); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (assessing the Social Security Act);
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (assessing National Minimum Drinking Age
law); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (assessing the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975); Barnes v. Gorman,
536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002) (reading the Americans with Disabilities Act’s remedies as
coextensive of those available under Title VI).
245. E.g., Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 512 (1990) (regarding Medicaid);
Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 864 (6th Cir. 2002) (regarding Medicaid);
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 688–89 (1979) (finding a private cause of action
in Title IX).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (“For the purpose of enabling each State . . . to furnish (1)
medical assistance on behalf of families . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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to support) may enforce Medicaid’s mandates.247 Similarly, Title IX’s
text focuses on the protected party, not the funded institution.248
While FERPA was also passed pursuant to the Spending Clause and
conditions federal funding on compliance with the Act,249 its text focuses on the regulated party, rather than the protected individuals.250
This difference is not merely semantic. Rather, it helps illuminate the
reasoning behind why courts have generally disallowed private enforcement of FERPA but have repeatedly allowed private enforcement
of Title IX. Because FERPA’s language “create[s] ‘no implication of an
intent to confer rights on a particular class of persons,’”251 but Title
IX’s does, private litigants may not enforce the former but may enforce
the latter.252 This focus on protected individuals also comports with
Title VI jurisprudence, where the Court has highlighted again and
again that the people Title VI seeks to protect are considered thirdparty beneficiaries of the Title VI contract.253
Title IX’s text clearly indicates that the educational institution is
not the sole beneficiary of the law, and perhaps not even its prime beneficiary.254 Without recourse for its violation, Title IX cannot protect
its beneficiaries as intended. Treating educational institution employees as third-party beneficiaries is consistent not only with the way the
Court has treated similarly situated individuals under other spending
power legislation, but also with the Court’s own Title IX jurisprudence.
It makes little sense for the Court to acknowledge third-party
beneficiaries under other Spending Clause contracts,255 and yet deny
247. Supra Part I.B.3.
248. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded . . . .”).
249. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 278–79 (2002).
250. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(a)(1)(A) (“No funds shall be made available . . . to any educational agency . . . .”).
251. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287 (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294
(1981)).
252. Cf. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289 (2001) (noting that private litigants may enforce Title VI, after which Title IX was patterned).
253. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) (“When a federal-funds recipient
violates conditions of Spending Clause legislation, the wrong done is the failure to provide what the contractual obligation requires; and that wrong is ‘made good’ when the
recipient compensates the Federal Government or a third-party beneficiary (as in this
case) for the loss caused by that failure.” (emphasis omitted)); Guardians Ass’n v. Civ.
Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 633 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Because Title VI is
intended to ensure that ‘no person’ is subject to discrimination in federally assisted
programs, private parties function as third-party beneficiaries to these contracts.”).
254. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
255. For example, Medicaid. See Part I.B.3.
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that same recognition to educational employees under Title IX. This
would essentially amount to the Court needlessly overturning some of
its own precedent, by removing educational employees from Title IX’s
purview as acknowledged in North Haven,256 and partially voiding its
implied private right of action as acknowledged in Cannon.257 That
outcome is neither viable nor just.
Because Title VII and Title IX give rise to distinct legal duties, the
Supreme Court should resolve this split by allowing aggrieved educational institution employees to file suit under both schemes. This is
consistent with Spending Clause jurisprudence and a long history of
allowing concurrent tort and contract claims at common law. Moreover, as discussed in the next Subsection, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prefer for litigants to bring concurrent claims in a single suit.
B. THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FAVOR ALTERNATIVE AND
HYPOTHETICAL PLEADING OF MULTIPLE CLAIMS IN THE SAME SUIT
This Subsection will establish that allowing litigants to plead violation of multiple legal duties is consistent with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which prefer litigants bring concurrent claims in a
single suit. In addition, this preference is not merely theoretical or ideological—it appears in lawsuits all the time and courts have no trouble
dealing with dual claims arising from the same conduct.
1. Consistent with the FRCP, Aggrieved Employees Should Be
Allowed to Sue Under Both Titles in the Same Lawsuit
As discussed in Part I, Rule 8(d)(2) of the FRCP states the rules’
preference for alternative and hypothetical pleading.258 This is particularly important when addressing Titles VII and IX because while each
statute may seek to ameliorate the same problem, the elements of the
causes of action are different. Because Title IX meets the Spending
Clause contract requirements set out in Dole,259 the educational institution is considered to have notice of its obligation not to discriminate.260 Because of this notice requirement, in order to succeed on a
claim for monetary damages under Title IX, litigants may only plead
256. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 530 (1982).
257. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 680 (1979). This holding could also effectively overturn the body of caselaw interpreting Title IX as consistent with Title VI,
a change that could result in further confusion about what Title IX really means. See
supra note 69–76 and accompanying text.
258. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(2).
259. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987).
260. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
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and prevail on a claim of intentional discrimination.261 Contrast this
with Title VII, where a litigant need not rely on pleading intentional
discrimination. Instead, a plaintiff may allege discrimination resulting
in a disparate impact.262
Thus, Title IX and Title VII may in some situations truly be alternative, in the sense that a plaintiff may not know all of the facts at the
pleading stage to be able to determine whether she will prevail on an
intentional discrimination theory under Title IX or if she should instead rely on a disparate impact claim263 arising under Title VII. This
situation also ties into Rule 8’s requirement that even “hypothetical”
claims be pled together.264 Where facts are still unknown, causes of
action may still be hypothetical, given that the pleading stage does not
require proving all of the elements of a claim, but rather only requires
that the facts plausibly allege the elements of the claim.265 It follows
that where a plaintiff believes in good faith that her employer has violated the terms of its Title IX contract but does not have the facts
needed to prove Dole’s notice requirement,266 she should be allowed
to plausibly allege disparate impact, for which she must rely on Title
VII instead.267 Alternative pleading also enhances efficiency, since a
litigant is expected to bring all related claims in one suit, cutting down
on duplicative lawsuits in the future.268
The ability to plead both claims is consistent with the abolition of
the election of remedies doctrine. The doctrine was a product of common law pleading rules, which were concerned less with access to the
261. Id.
262. Supra Part I.A.1. While the Court has never definitively ruled on whether Title
IX disparate impact claims may triumph, the court decided in Alexander v. Sandoval
that private litigants may not sue under § 602 of Title VI based on a disparate impact
theory. 532 U.S. 275, 289 (2001). Given Title IX and Title VI’s similarities, it seems
likely the Court would hold the same when addressing whether disparate impact
claims are available under Title IX.
263. See supra Part I.A.1.
264. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(2).
265. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679, 685 (2009).
266. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987).
267. The FRCP would allow such a plaintiff to plead the Title IX violation on “information, and belief” even if she does not have sufficient facts to prove the claim at the
pleading stage. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (“[The Party] certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances: . . .[T]he factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically
so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery . . . .”).
268. See generally McDonald, supra note 142.
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courts and more with efficiency at trial.269 This policy change recognizes that different claims should be adjudicated together in order to
ensure “settlement of disputes on their merits.”270 Despite the abolition of the doctrine, double recovery for the multiple claims arising
from the same conduct is precluded.271
This does not, however, suggest that bringing both types of claims
concurrently is somehow duplicative or unnecessary. To the contrary,
the different types of relief accorded to Title VII and Title IX litigants
reduces the likelihood that a court would even need to wrestle with
whether they may be running afoul of a rule barring double recovery.
For example, punitive damages are generally unavailable under Title
IX, in direct contrast to their availability under Title VII.272 Given Title
VII’s cap on compensatory damages,273 it seems feasible that a jury
could wish to award a litigant compensatory damages in excess of that
threshold. A plaintiff should have the right to pursue those damages
under Title IX.
Because of the legal system’s preference for alternative and hypothetical pleading, as well as the pleading stage’s requirement to
only plausibly allege and not prove causes of action, the Supreme
Court should resolve this split in favor of educational institution employees’ right to choose between Titles or simultaneously plead both
claims.
2. Courts Are Capable of Properly Adjudicating Concurrent Tort
and Contract Claims
Not only do the rules prefer concurrent claims, but bringing them
is also workable, as evidenced by the cases cited in Part III.A.2. In Cargill, the issue of whether the misappropriation and breach of contract
claims were sufficiently distinct from each other to survive occurred
on cross-motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.274 The

269. See generally MILLER ET AL., supra note 147.
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519, 529 (10th Cir. 1979) (“[A] plaintiff is
not entitled to a separate compensatory damage award under each legal theory. Rather, he is entitled to only one compensatory damage award should liability be found
on any of the three, or more than the three theories involved.”).
272. Supra notes 47, 81. Note again that this mimics the available remedies for contract and tort claims.
273. Supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
274. Cargill, Inc. v. Sears Petroleum & Transp. Corp., 388 F. Supp. 2d 37, 45
(N.D.N.Y. 2005).
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parties had already received not only numerous rulings from the presiding judge, but also a jury verdict.275 The case thus demonstrates
that when both types of claims arise from the same conduct, adjudication is workable. Looking specifically at the jury verdict, the jury was
able to assess each claim, despite their connections and overlap, and
award the plaintiff damages for misappropriation of trade secrets276
as well as a separate award for breach of contract.277 After trial, the
judge found “no basis to disturb” any of the prior holdings.278
In SCO, the Tenth Circuit reversed a summary judgment grant
based on the independent tort doctrine279 because “a reasonable jury
could find here that regardless of whether IBM performed to the letter
of the [contract], IBM nonetheless misappropriated SCO’s labor, skills,
expenditures or good will through fraud or deception.”280 This holding
again demonstrates courts’ belief in juries’ abilities to successfully
perform their role despite the close nature of possibly interrelated
claims.281
In Westlake Plaza Realty, Inc. v. Leyden, a California court of appeals addressed claims of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty,
and fraud, all arising from the same set of facts.282 After the trial court
awarded “aggregate” damages for all three claims, defendants appealed, arguing plaintiffs had essentially triple-recovered for the same
conduct.283 Again, the California court explained that “[t]he same
wrongful conduct may constitute both breach of contract and a
tort.”284 The court further explained that “the plaintiff is not prevented
275. Id.
276. Cargill, Inc. v. Sears Petroleum & Transp. Corp., No. 5:03-CV-0530, 2005 WL
8147597, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2005) (awarding Sears $275,608.81 for misappropriation of trade secrets).
277. Id. (awarding Sears $500,025.19 for breach of contract and unfair competition).
278. Cargill, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 45.
279. SCO Grp., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 879 F.3d 1062, 1076–78 (10th Cir.
2018).
280. Id. at 1078 (internal citations, quotation marks, and modifications omitted).
281. By the time of the Tenth Circuit’s holding, this litigation had been ongoing for
nearly fifteen years. Id. at 1074. It appears the parties never sought judgement on remand regarding this issue, suggesting they may have settled, an outcome the legal system favors. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme
Court, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 37–38 (1996) (explaining the various benefits of settling suits
out of court, including reduced burden on the courts, decrease in expenses for parties,
more flexibility in allowed outcomes, etc.).
282. No. B187590, 2007 WL 2081343 (Cal. Ct. App. July 23, 2007).
283. Id. at *3–4.
284. Id. at *4.
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from pursuing recovery on multiple theories, but may recover compensatory damages only under one theory.”285 The court highlighted
the trial court’s acknowledgment that plaintiff could not triple recover
and that the award did not violate that principle.286
Like these cases, a plaintiff alleging sex discrimination in violation of both Title VII and Title IX is bringing claims sounding in both
tort and contract, and doing so in a single lawsuit, just as the FRCP
contemplate and prefer. Despite the claims arising out of the same circumstances, courts are able to effectively adjudicate them each on the
merits even with overlapping facts and theories. Thus, disallowing
simultaneous Title IX and Title VII claims would disregard and disrespect a sweeping body of jurisprudence touching each part of this
problem: caselaw acknowledging Titles IX’s and VII’s differences in
kind; caselaw acknowledging interrelated contract and tort claims;
the FRCP’s thoughtful preferences; and courts’ ability to acknowledge
all of these in effectively adjudicating claims. The Supreme Court
should avoid that outcome and instead allow for litigants to bring either type of claim or both concurrently. The following Subsections will
further establish that this outcome is preferable because it reflects respect both for Congress’s enumerated powers, as well as its intent behind Title IX.
C. DENYING EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION EMPLOYEES THEIR RIGHT TO SUE
UNDER TITLE IX WEAKENS CONGRESS’S RIGHT TO TAX AND SPEND
Despite some dispute among the United States’ founding fathers
about the true scope of Congress’s spending power,287 decades of
caselaw demonstrate the contract thesis reigns.288 The Supreme Court
should decide this split in favor of concurrent claims in order to respect Congress’s constitutional grant of authority to tax and spend. As
noted earlier, there are huge numbers of employees under Title IX’s
purview.289 It should be no surprise that the federal government disburses a similarly large amount of money to educational institutions.290 Despite the fact that federal funding may amount to a relatively small proportion of an institution’s operating budget, the loss of
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Supra Part I.B.2.
288. E.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619 (1937); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181
(2002).
289. Supra notes 15–16.
290. Supra note 5 and accompanying text. Though, some would argue the amount
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any funding for violation of Title IX could present a sufficiently substantial problem for institutions that the threat of that loss serves as a
deterrent to unlawful practices. For example, the University of Minnesota’s main campus (Twin Cities), received approximately $835 million in federal funds in 2018.291 The University of Minnesota-Duluth
campus received approximately $70 million in 2018.292 While those
figures constitute less than 25% of the University’s entire annual operating budget of $4.2 billion,293 it is still hard to imagine how such a
university could replace sums of that size. Thus, federal funding is a
very important carrot at the end of an equally important stick—a
framework that mimics years of Congress’s accepted flexing of its
spending power. Denying educational employees the ability to enforce
that arrangement merely because they are protected similarly under
another statute neuters Congress’s enumerated power294 and the Supreme Court should avoid that outcome.
D. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE IX BY EMPLOYEES IS WARRANTED
BECAUSE OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS’ IMPORTANCE IN SHAPING SOCIETAL
VALUES AND CONGRESS’S REPEATED ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION SETTINGS
In addition to holding covered institutions to two distinct legal
duties, one arising out of a contract and the other arising out of a social
policy against discrimination, allowing educational institution employees to enforce Title IX is appropriate because sex discrimination
continues to plague educational institutions.295 This is particularly
grievous because of schools’ role in shaping gender-related ideas
about future ability and achievement. Various studies indicate that a
disbursed actually pales in comparison to what is needed for the United States’ education system. See, e.g., Diane Ravitch & Tom Loveless, Broken Promises: What the Federal
Government Can Do to Improve American Education, BROOKINGS (Mar. 1, 2000),
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/broken-promises-what-the-federal
-government-can-do-to-improve-american-education
[https://perma.cc/RXN5
-KH9E]; Knight, supra note 5.
291. Explore the Federal Investment in Your Alma Mater, supra note 4 (scroll down
to “My Alma Mater”; click on map; zoom in on Minneapolis, MN; select University of
Minnesota-Twin Cities).
292. Id. (scroll down to “My Alma Mater”; click on map; zoom in on Duluth, MN;
select University of Minnesota-Duluth).
293. About U Budget, UNIV. OF MINN., https://finance.umn.edu/budget.html
[https://perma.cc/76SD-YS8A].
294. Supra Part I.B.2.
295. See Zehrt, supra note 19, at 733 (citing Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H.R. 16098 Before Spec. Subcomm. on Educ. of the H. Comm. on
Educ. and Lab., 91st Cong. 1 (1970)).
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teacher’s gender may influence a student’s performance. “Assignment
to a same-gender teacher improves performance for both girls and
boys . . . .”296 One study found a correlation between women who took
introductory-level university classes from woman instructors and
those students’ later choices of major: “Female students that are assigned to female professors for their introductory math and science
classes not only perform better in those classes but are also much
more likely to major in science, math, or engineering . . . .”297 Another
study found that the math achievement gap between boys and girls
lessens or disappears in societies with more gender equality.298 Further research suggests that “[f]emale students may avoid male-dominated fields due to biases against women, and the presence of female
faculty may mitigate these effects.”299
Taken together, these studies suggest the very outcome the framers of Title IX and its precursor legislation were afraid of: that sex discrimination in educational institutions would result in harm not only
to the victim of the discrimination, but also the students who witness
discriminatory treatment and use it inform their understanding of
their own roles or future opportunities.300 When women are excluded
from certain roles and departments (like STEM fields) based on their
gender, women and girls studying in those departments learn that
they are similarly unwelcome. Women role models across departments and specialties may have a positive impact on the net number
of women who pursue fields typically dominated by men.301

296. Marianne Bertrand, New Perspectives on Gender, in 4B HANDBOOK OF LABOR
ECONOMICS 1543, 1567 (David Card & Orley Ashenfelter eds., 2011).
297. Id. (citing Scott E. Carrell, Marianne E. Page & James E. West, Sex and Science:
How Professor Gender Perpetuates the Gender Gap, 125 Q.J. OF ECON. 1101 (2010)).
298. Luigi Guiso, Ferdinando Monte, Paolo Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, Culture, Gender, and Math, 320 SCIENCE 1164 (2008).
299. Eric P. Bettinger & Bridget Terry Long, Do Faculty Serve as Role Models? The
Impact of Instructor Gender on Female Students, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 152, 152 (2005) (citations omitted).
300. Supra notes 198–200.
301. See Bettinger, supra note 299, at 152–53. Teacher role modeling has also been
shown to have an impact on students in other ways not related to the gender of the
instructor or student. See Anthony Amalba, Francis A. Abantanga, Albert J.J.A.
Scherpbier & Walther N.K.A. van Mook, Community-Based Education: The Influence of
Role Modeling on Career Choice and Practice Location, 39 MED. TCHR. 174 (2016); see
also Frederick M. Hess & David L. Leal, Minority Teachers, Minority Students, and College Matriculation: A New Look at the Role-Modeling Hypothesis, 25 POL’Y STUD. J. 235,
235 (1997) (“[T]he percentage of minority faculty has a significant positive relationship with overall college matriculation rates in urban school districts across the nation.”).
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Congress’s repeated acknowledgment of both ongoing discrimination in education settings, and the fact that the fear of snowballing
impacts of that discrimination animated the original enactment of this
legislation, are reason enough to ensure eligible employees are not denied their Title IX rights.
While an educational institution employee may sue under Title
VII to address these same harms, that choice is particularly difficult
and time-consuming because of Title VII’s administrative exhaustion
requirement, which is especially burdensome for public employees.302
The lack of an exhaustion requirement under Title IX and, thus, the
relative ease with which a plaintiff may sue under the Title, enhances
Title IX’s ability to address Congress’s intended aims. Making it easier
for private parties to enforce Congress’s goals allows for more expedient improvement of the problems that underscore Title IX’s existence—reducing sex discrimination for the benefit of all persons in educational institutions.
While Title VII and Title IX seek to right the same wrong, they do
so by imposing distinct and independent legal duties on employers,
one sounding in tort and the other in contract. Thus, aggrieved employees should be allowed to seek redress for breach of either duty or
both duties in the same lawsuit. This outcome comports with the way
courts treat concurrent contract and tort claims generally, and importantly, also comports with the fact that courts treat Spending
Clause legislation as contracts. Allowing for concurrent Title IX and
Title VII claims also respects Congress’s various enumerated powers,
which it has used at its discretion to address interrelated problems—
sex discrimination in workplaces and educational institutions. By allowing a plaintiff to bring her choice of claims, courts respect the issues animating both Titles, as well as the full body of caselaw and legal
tradition that allow for simultaneous claims. For these reasons, if presented with this circuit split, the Supreme Court should hold that eligible plaintiffs should be allowed to choose between Title IX and Title
VII or file suit under both Titles to remediate the harm sex discrimination causes.
CONCLUSION
Title IX’s passage under the Spending Clause makes it significantly different from Title VII, passed under the Commerce Clause, despite the similarities in their end goals. The Supreme Court should
treat them as different in settling this circuit split. By looking to its
302. Supra Part I.B.1.
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own Spending Clause jurisprudence, as well as courts’ general treatment of concurrent contract and tort claims, the Court should
acknowledge the distinct legal duties each Title imposes on covered
entities. Furthermore, acknowledging Title IX’s character as Spending
Clause legislation helps maintain one of Congress’s enumerated powers after significant debate about that power’s scope. This outcome
also upholds the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s preference for alternative pleading and is consistent with the reasons behind that preference. Moreover, because schools play a large role in developing students’ own self-image, ending sex discrimination in that environment
serves society as a whole, while also helping individual victims of discrimination.

